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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The analogy between natural and market selection that underlies popular (and some 
scholarly) notions of “competition” has inclined many to believe that an increase in the 
severity of selection pressures will inhibit the willingness of firms to invest and innovate in 
new technologies.  The problem arises because selection based on current fitness is myopic, 
and, in a market context, this means that only current performance matters. In these 
circumstances, anything that increases selection pressures will concentrate attention on 
current fitness, discouraging behaviour that sacrifices current performance for enhanced 
future performance.  In a market context, this means that increasing selection pressures will 
diminish incentives to invest (e.g. in technological change).  
 
Actually, things are not quite this simple. There are two levels of selection through 
which a firm must pass if it is to survive: product market selection and capital market 
selection. Product market selection operates through the mechanism of consumer choice. 
Firms whose products are of good value attract customers, earn profits and use them to 
expand. Although some customers take a long-sighted view and support innovative firms with 
temporarily high prices, this is definitely not the general rule (particularly in consumer 
markets). Capital market selection is, in principle, different. Banks and other financial 
institutions will often make loans to firms who seek to improve their future competitiveness at 
the risk of weakening their current financial position, and they will also loan to firms whose 
current activities are unprofitable if they believe that improvements will be made in the near 
future. In this sense, capital market selection may midigate some of the effects of product 
market selection, making current fitness much less important in determining an enterprise’s 
future growth and development than would be the case if product market selection were the 
only force operating in markets.  
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In this paper, we explore the relationship between the severity of selection 
mechanisms and the myopia of selection processes using a simple simulation model of a 
duopoly in which one firm tries to move down a learning curve in which costs are initially 
higher than its rival’s but ultimately much lower. The intensity of product market selection is 
studied by varying a parameter which denotes the degree of consumer price sensitivity: the 
more price sensitive are consumers the more severe is selection. In the absence of capital 
market selection, increases in market selection pressures have two opposing effects on the 
decision to invest in the learning technology.  On the one hand, the more severe are selection 
pressures, the less likely is it that the learning technology will survive due to its higher initial 
costs (and prices). On the other hand, if it does survive, the learning technology will be more 
competitive the more severe are selection pressures. This second effect means that a long-
sighted lender may be willing to support such investments, particularly when product market 
selection pressures are particularly strong. As a consequence, the addition of capital market 
selection completely confounds the common presumption: as product market selection 
pressures become more severe, the ability of the learning firm to borrow against future 
performance increases and this facilitates the introduction of the learning technology. That is, 
increases in the severity of product market competition increase the likelihood that the new 
technology will be introduced when capital market agents are prepared to lend against future 
performance.   
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section II, we introduce the model. The 
main modelling challenges are the need to parameterize the severity of product market 
selection pressures in a manner which makes comparative static exercises fairly transparent, 
and the need to introduce a simple and tractable extension of the model to allow for capital 
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market selection. Our basic results are summarized in the form of four propositions, and these 
are discussed in Section III, and Section IV contains a few concluding observations. 
 
II. THE  MODEL 
We suppose that there are two firms, i = 1,2, that there exist exogenous entry barriers 
which mean that there will always only be two firms, and that the two firms price non-
cooperatively and do not collude. Firm 1 operates with a “traditional technology” which 
enables it to produce output x1(t) at constant unit costs c1. Firm 2 invests in a “learning 
technology” in which unit costs are initially c0 > c1, but fall with cumulative output, Q ≡ Στ 
{x2(τ) + 1}: 
 
       c2(t) = c0Q(t)λ.        (1) 
 
λ is the learning index and is equal to logβ/log2 where β is the rate of learning and 1-
β is the progress ratio.1.  If we want to set our learning index close to the empirically 
relevant progress ratio of .20 then we must set λ close to log.80/log2 = -.32. In the 
simulation exercise below we perform comparative static exercizes using values of λ 
close to .3.  
 
Since, in principle, firm 2 could have opted to use the traditional technology, the 
difference between the two firms’ initial costs, Δ ≡{c0 – c1}, can be thought of as the per 
period fixed (licensing) cost that firm 2 has to pay to get access to the learning technology. In 
the model we use the parameter δ to denote the percentage difference in initial costs between 
the two firms (δ=.4 means that there is a 40% initial cost difference). Clearly, if learning is 
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slow and set up costs are high (i.e. if λ is small and δ is large), then the learning technology is 
unlikely to displace the traditional technology. Finally, we define t* as the time when the two 
technologies achieve parity; i.e. t* satisfies c1 = c2(t*). This “switch-over point” identifies the 
earliest time at which the learning technology can survive the most severe product market 
selection pressures. 
 
Since we have assumed the existence of exogenous entry barriers, selection in product 
markets operates only through price competition between the two established players.  Hence, 
the severity of selection depends on how sensitive consumers are to price differences between 
firms. There are several ways to model this. One is to suppose that all consumers are the 
same, and to allow parametric variations in their elasticity of demand (or some such 
parameter) to reflect variations in the intensity of selection. Another is to suppose that there 
are different types of consumers, some more price sensitive than others. In this case, the 
intensity of market selection pressures will reflect differences in the population mix. We have 
opted for this second course. We suppose that there are a fixed number, N, consumers, and 
that θ% of them are sensitive to prices (i.e. they always buy from the low priced firm). The 
remaining (1 - θ)N “noisy consumers” choose randomly between the two firms regardless of 
the sign or size of the price difference between them.  If both firms change the same price, the 
“price sensitive consumers” choose randomly between them. 
 
This specification of demand produces a ‘kink’ in the demand facing the two firms. In 
particular, if: 
 
       p1 > p2,    x1 = (1 - θ)N/2    and    x2 = θN + (1 - θ)N/2;  (2) 
     p1 = p2,     x1 =  x2 = N/2;   and  
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     p1 < p2,     x1 =  θN + (1 - θ)N/2   and    x2 = (1 - θ)N/2. 
 
Clearly, when θ  = 1, only price sensitive consumers are present in the market, and selection 
pressures are as severe as they can be. When θ = 0, on the other hand, consumers are all noisy 
and they choose randomly between the two firms. In this case, no effective selection occurs. 
 
 We assume that firms do not know the value of θ and cannot identify “price sensitive” 
or “noisy” consumers or discriminate between them.  If this market were monopolized 
recognized and θ were known to be small (i.e. when most consumers are noisy), the 
monopolist will be tempted to set P→ ∞, driving price sensitive consumers out of the market 
and taking full advantage of the rest.  To rule this out, we would have to suppose that (2) is an 
approximation to true demand behaviour which is accurate only in the neighbourhood of c1.  
Alternatively, we could suppose that there is a large queue of potential entrants who will enter 
if price exceeds some limit, p1 > c1.  The duopolists in our model set prices non-cooperatively, 
so there will be a strong tendency for prices to fall to the level of costs.  Still if the duopolists 
know that θ is small, they might price above costs.  To keep the analysis tractable, we rule 
this out.   
 
It is worth making four observations on our specification of consumer price 
sensitivity. First, market demand has no elasticity in this model, but the demand facing 
individual firms is elastic (at least in the neighbourhood of the point at which their prices are 
equal).  Aside from basic tractability, this specification has the virtue of concentrating 
attention on competitive pressures. Market growth is something which benefits all firms and it 
also facilitates the introduction of new technologies (whose fixed costs can be spread over a 
larger output or whose per unit cost savings increase with market size). Ruling out 
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exogenously or endogenously generated market growth helps to make market selection more 
difficult than it might otherwise be, and it is easy to see how the results will be affected by a 
generalization along these lines.  
 
Second, although consumers base their choice solely on price (product quality is not 
introduced in the model), there are different ways that the ‘noise’ embodied in θ can be 
interpreted.  For example, θ can be interpreted as reflecting the degree of brand loyalty in the 
market in a way that is similar to the ‘preference parameter’ used in Cabral and Riordan 
(1994).  In a model of a price-setting, differentiated duopoly selling to a sequence of 
heterogeneous buyers with uncertain demands, they define the preference parameter as the 
variance of the distribution of consumer preferences for a particular firm’s product. 
Consumers buy from that firm only if the degree to which they like its product is larger than 
the degree to which its price is larger than the other firm’s price.  They find that the higher is 
the variance of the distribution, the larger is this firm’s asymptotic market share.  This is 
similar to our result (below) that the lower is the degree of consumer price sensitivity, θ (i.e. 
the more random is selection), the higher is the asymptotic market share of the learning firm.   
 
The third observation relates (2) to the literature on evolutionary dynamics2.  These 
models often represent the selection mechanism by using a “replicator” function which 
relates fitness (e.g. the difference between a firms costs and those of its rivals) to reproductive 
success (e.g. changes in the firm’s market share). Since prices are related to costs (see below) 
and N is fixed, it is clear that (2) is just a very specific type of replicator function linking cost 
differences to market shares. Its virtue in our eyes is that it displays the mechanics of how 
selection rewards fitness in a way which can be related to basic features of consumer 
behaviour. 
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Finally, although we look at θ in a comparative statics framework, there are several 
ways θ can be made to evolve endogenously.  The degree of consumer price sensitivity could, 
for example, depend on the degree to which prices differ between the two firms: when price 
differences are small consumers are less price sensitive. Or it could also depend on more local 
consumer behavior such as that described in Cowan et al. (1997) where consumers are 
influenced by the consumption behavior of others. This can take the form of buying what the 
‘best’ people bought (a group to which the individual aspires to be similar) not buying what 
the ‘worst’ people bought (a group from which the individual seeks to differentiate 
him/herself), or copying the buying behavior of their closest peers (Cowan et al. 1997). We 
choose to keep θ exogenous for the use of clarity in the comparative statics and also because 
our experiments with an endogenous θ do not significantly alter the results found. We discuss 
this further below.  
 
Capital market selection pressures describe the ability of firms to finance current costs 
incurred to generate future profits. The effects of capital market selection are reflected in the 
amount of money that firms can borrow, and on what terms. Our interest here is in trying to 
parameterize the constraints imposed by the capital market in as simple a manner as possible. 
Suppose that firm 2 incurs losses to travel down its learning curve as fast as possible. Once it 
has reached unit cost parity with firm 1 (which occurs at t* and is endogenous to the model), 
it can begin to earn profits to pay these losses back. If t0 is the time at which these (total) 
losses are offset by subsequent profits, then T≡ t0 - t* > 0 is the pay-back period. If the capital 
market refuses loans with a pay-back period longer than ϕ, then increases in ϕ correspond to a 
weakening in capital market selection pressures. In the limit as ϕ → 0, we revert to a situation 
in which only product market selection pressures matter for firms. Put another way, the size of 
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ϕ is a simple measure of the extent to which capital markets alleviate (myopic) product 
market selection pressures. 
 
The final aspect of model specification is pricing. In the absence of a capital market, 
firms cannot make losses and survive, and, when firms choose prices non-cooperatively, this 
means that prices will be driven down to costs. In a “no-loss pricing regime”, prices will, 
therefore, be given by: 
 
p1 = c1     and      p2(t) = c2(t-1).     (3) 
 
where we have introduced a lag to simplify our computations. If firms can borrow on the 
capital market, then firm 2 can price more aggressively, setting current losses against the 
future profits which will appear when it has become more efficient than firm 1.3  For firm 2, 
this means undercutting firm 1 in order to build up experience (through cumulative sales). The 
very specific nature of (2) makes this “strategic pricing regime” very simple to describe.4 In 
particular, what matters from the point of view of attracting consumers is that p2 is less than 
p1.  Since θ is exogenous, the absolute size of this difference has no effect on the demand for 
firm 2’s product, and this means that all it needs to do is to slightly undercut firm 1 both 
before and after t*. Hence, in this regime, prices will be given by: 
 
p1 =  c1    and    p2 = c1 - ξ,    for some ξ > 0.5    (4) 
 
By way of summary, then, the model determines values of three variables of interest: 
t*, the switch point at which the new learning technology becomes cost competitive with the 
established, traditional technology; s*, the long run market share achieved by the learning 
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technology; and T≡ t0 - t*  , the pay-back period when firms are allowed to price strategically.  
The exogenous parameters of the model are: θ, the degree of product market selection 
pressure; N, the market size; λ, the learning rate (or index); δ, the licensing cost of the 
learning technology (described by the percentage difference in initial costs); ξ, the price 
discount used in the strategic pricing regime; and the pricing rule used (no-loss or strategic). 
In the simulations we experiment with different values of these parameters except in the case 
of ξ (arbitrarily set at .005) due to the fact that the structure of (1) makes the exact value of 
this parameter irrelevant.    
 
III. THE RESULTS 
Using simulation techniques we explore the types of market structures which emerge 
under different parameter conditions, where by market structure we mean the values of s* and 
t*. For each set of initial conditions, we first solve for output via (2) (based on the initial 
prices in [3] and [4],  then for the costs (and prices) of the learning firm via (1), and then 
again for output via (2) etc.  In the case of strategic pricing, we also calculate the time period 
t0 at which the learning firm is able to fully pay back its debt accrued by pricing above cost.    
 
Our results can be summarized in the form of four propositions. We start by 
examining the ‘no-loss’ pricing regime where firms are forced to price in a way which enables 
them to break even period by period.  
 
Proposition #1: Long run market shares, s*, and the time at which the new technology 
becomes established, t*,  increase in θ. 
 
The first part of this proposition follows directly from (2) without the need for any 
simulation. Given the nature of demand in (2), firm 2’s market share is either equal to 0, or it 
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is somewhere between 50% and 100%. If  θ = 1, all consumers are price sensitive and, since 
firm 2 is the high priced firm initially, it never attracts any customers. However, once θ falls 
slightly below unity (i.e. some noisy consumers are present), firm 2 will attract some 
customers. This, of course, happens every period, and since nothing in the model limits the 
ability of firm 2 to go down the learning curve (as long as θ<1), all of this means that firm 2 
will eventually become cost competitive with firm 1. The smaller is θ, the more sales it enjoys 
period by period (and, therefore, cumulatively at any time t) and, when θ = 0, it captures 50% 
of the market initially and in every period up until t*. In the long run when c2 < c1, and, as a 
consequence, p2 < p1, the market share of firm 2 is s* = (1 + θ)/2.6  Columns 1 and 2 in Table 
1 illustrate this result.  
 
The fact that t* increases with θ is intuitively obvious as well. When θ is just slightly 
below unity, firm 2 attracts only a few noisy customers per period, and, regardless of the 
learning rate, this means that it will take a long time for it to accumulate enough experience, 
Q, to get far enough down the learning curve to achieve cost parity with firm 1. However, the 
lower is θ, the more noisy customers there are, and, consequently, the more sales firm 2 will 
enjoy. All of this means that it will learn much faster than would otherwise have been the case 
had θ been larger. The net effect is that t* is brought forward; i.e. as θ decreases, t* falls. This 
holds for any parameter values as long as the learning firm prices at unit costs (the case of 
strategic pricing is reviewed later). Columns 3-6 in Table I show this result with different 
market sizes and initial cost differences and columns 3-5 in Table II with different learning 
indices: in each case as θ increases, t* falls.  When θ = 1, firm 2 never emerges. 
TABLE I 
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The substance of Proposition #1 is that increases in selection pressure slow the arrival 
of the new technology, making it harder for it to become established. This, of course, appears 
to be an instance of myopic selection, and it appears to work to the disadvantage of 
consumers. However, if and when the new technology becomes established, then increases in 
selection pressure bring larger gains to firm 2, since stronger selection gives an increasingly 
large reward to the cost efficiencies which have accompanied the introduction of the new 
technology. This too reflects the workings of myopic selection, since, once again, selection is 
merely rewarding superior current performance. In this case, however, myopic selection 
appears to work in consumers’ interests. The bottom line, then, is that the common 
presumption is (roughly) right: product market selection is myopic in the sense that it 
discourages the emergence of new, superior technologies. However, myopic selection based 
only on current performance differences at least has the virtue of rewarding firms who have 
somehow managed to establish superior technologies on the market.  
 
Proposition #2: The time it takes the learning technology to become established, t*, 
increases in its licensing costs, δ, market size, N, and decreases in the learning index, λ. 
 
Columns 3-6 in Table I and columns 3-5 in Table II contain a range of simulations 
which document the assertions in Proposition #2. Table I indicates that with a given θ, an 
increase in market size (N=50⇒100) and a decrease in the initial cost difference (from δ=.5 to 
δ=.4) allow firm 2 to proceed more quickly down the learning curve, causing t* to fall. Table 
II indicates that this also occurs through an increase in the learning index (from λ = -.1 to λ =  
-.5). Column 4 in Table II indicates that when the rate of learning is relatively high (λ=.5) it 
almost doesn’t matter what the value of θ is since cost convergence occurs very quickly. 
Column 5 indicates that this is less true when the initial cost difference is very large (from 
δ=.4 to δ=.9).  The relatively high δ and λ in column 5 of Table II can be interpreted as 
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follows: if the learning firm wants to obtain a fast rate of learning (to reach t* more quickly) it 
will have to make a large initial investment reflected in a high δ.  
                                   TABLE II 
 
Intuitively, these propositions are fairly easy to grasp. Licensing costs are just another 
way of referring to the initial investment which firm 2 must make in the learning technology: 
δ is the initial unit cost disadvantage which it accepts in order to have access to the lower 
costs in the future available through learning. The higher is this initial cost penalty, the longer 
it takes (ceteris paribus) to establish cost parity. Market size matters to firm 2 because the 
number of consumers it serves when its price is higher than that of firm 1 is (1 - θ)N. Clearly, 
the larger is the market, the more (noisy) consumers it attracts period by period for a given θ. 
This enables it to build up experience more quickly, and (ceteris paribus) accelerated learning 
rates mean a short time taken to reach cost parity. Similarly, decreases in λ mean faster 
learning rates (ceteris paribus), and that clearly serves to bring t* forward. 
 
Figure I illustrates Proposition #1 and #2 simultaneously by looking at the relationship 
between t* and θ with different initial cost differences, δ.  Although in both cases t* 
increases with θ (Proposition 1), in the case with a higher initial disadvantage for the 
learning firm (δ=.5), t* is higher for each value of θ.  We do not include in Fig. I the plot for 
θ = 1 or θ = .99 because, as indicated in Table I and II,  in the former the learning firm never 
emerges, and in the latter it is so large that it distorts the graph (t*= 4149 for δ=.5 and 
t*=659 for δ=.4). Each θ represents a unique s* (Table I, column 2). A similar figure could 
have been drawn for the case with different N and λ. 
FIGURE I 
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It is worth noting that in Table I and II  t* seems rather large in many cases.  The 
values of λ which we are using are drawn from the empirical literature describing annual 
learning rates, θ is unit free, while one unit of N could describe any multiple of a basic 
product unit. This gives one an inclination to interpret t* as measuring “years” and, supposing 
this to be reasonable, Table I paints a rather dire story. Except in the most favourable 
circumstances (e.g. N =100, δ ≤ .4 and λ = -.5), it might take more than a decade for the new 
learning technology to become established (even when selection pressures are not very 
severe). In the most unfavourable circumstances (e.g. N =50, δ =.5 and λ = -.1), it might take 
as long as 83 years even with a relatively low degree of product market selection (e.g. θ = .5).    
 
Proposition #3: When firm 2 can price strategically, t* decreases in θ, and both t0 and T 
also decrease in θ. 
 
The essence of strategic pricing as we have modelled it here is that firm 2 undercuts 
firm 1 by an amount ξ. Prior to t*, this generates losses (since firm 2’s costs are higher than 
firm 1’s), but these losses are compensated by the profits made after t* when firm 2’s costs 
are below firm 1’s costs.7  It takes T periods of profit making after t* for the firm to break 
even. Intuitively, it is clear that t* must fall with increases in θ in this case, since a firm that 
prices strategically benefits from having price sensitive consumers: the more sales it captures, 
the faster it learns. By contrast, in the case of no-loss pricing, firm 2 benefited from having a 
relatively high population of noisy consumers in the market, since they are the source of its 
sales when it cannot undercut firm 1 (i.e. there is a trade-off between s* and t* with increases 
in θ).  Recall also that an increase in θ increases s* in all pricing regimes. It follows, then, that 
when capital markets allow firm 2 to price strategically, increases in product market selection 
pressure unambiguously facilitate the introduction of the new, learning technology: it comes 
sooner, and with a bigger market share reward for its sponsor.  Figure II illustrates the 
 14
different relationship between θ and t* under the two pricing regimes, with a given set of 
parameters.  
FIGURE II 
 
Table III repeats the calculations in Table I with strategic pricing.  Columns 3 and 6 
indicate the t* which arises with strategic pricing under different initial costs. Comparing 
these values to those in columns 3 and 5 in Table I we see that under strategic pricing as θ 
increases t* decreases. Columns 4 and 6 show T: the amount of time after t* that it takes the 
learning firm to fully pay back its debt accrued by pricing below cost prior to t*.  T decreases 
as θ increases since the quicker the firm learns the quicker it is able to reach t* and hence 
begin making profits to pay back its debt.  As with no-loss pricing, increases in N and λ 
decrease t* while increases in δ increase t*. 
TABLE III 
 
It is interesting to note that capital market selection does not necessarily loosen the 
effects of product market selection all that much. If capital markets insist on a pay-back 
period of ϕ (meaning that the learning technology only emerges T < ϕ) and if, as seems 
casually plausible, this is some number less than 10 years, then Table III indicates that the 
learning firm will only be able to payback the loan within that period if it already begins in a 
relatively favorable position (low initial cost difference, high learning rate, large market size). 
Yet it is precisely in these conditions that the learning firm could have probably gone down 
the learning curve quickly enough without the help of capital markets.  It is possible to 
identify those conditions under which the learning firms should/not take out a loan by looking 
at whether it is able to pay back the debt within a ‘reasonable’ payback period, ϕ. For 
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example, when there is a 50% initial cost difference, even with low product market selection 
θ = .4, the payback period will unlikely satisfy banks (T =30).8 One is tempted to conclude 
that while the introduction of capital market selection does in principle facilitate the 
introduction of new technologies, in practice relaxation of product market selection pressures 
may not have much practical effect.9 This brings us to Proposition # 4 which establishes the 
precise conditions under which it is worth it for the learning firm to price strategically (hence 
take out a loan).  
 
Proposition #4: The profitability of strategic pricing increases in θ, but no- loss pricing may 
be more profitable than strategic pricing at low values of θ and when learning is very slow. 
 
Proposition #4 identifies the basic determinants of firm 2’s optimal pricing strategy 
conditional on θ, N, λ and δ. The surprising feature of this proposition is that it may pay firm 
2 not to price strategically.10  In Table IV and Fig. III we calculate the total profits earned by 
the learning firm at t=100 under different parameter conditions.11 Since we know that the no-
loss pricing regime generates neither losses nor profits, as long as profits are positive at t=100 
we assume it is better for the learning firm to price strategically. To capture changes in the 
speed of learning we vary market size but could have shown the same result by varying either 
δ or λ.  
FIGURE III   
 
We see that when market size is very small (e.g. N=10), no matter what the value of θ 
is at t=100, the learning firm makes negative profits (losses) and hence strategic pricing is not 
recommended.  When market size is intermediate (e.g. N=40) strategic pricing is better only 
for values of θ > .4.  Only with relatively large market sizes (e.g. N=60-100) is strategic 
pricing better than no loss pricing for all values of θ. Figure IV below indicates the optimal  
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pricing strategy to pursue under different parameter conditions. The speed of learning is 
determined by all three parameters: δ, λ and N.  
Figure IV: Optimal pricing strategy grid 
   Very slow 
learning 
Intermediate 
learning 
Very fast 
learning 
Low θ  No-loss   No-loss Strategic 
High θ No-loss  Strategic  Strategic  
 
Intuitively, this result follows from the observation that no-loss pricing works best 
when most consumers are noisy, since the price disadvantage which firm 2 initially suffers is 
not penalized when consumers do not care about prices.  Hence when θ is low, it is not 
necessary for firm 2 to borrow from the capital market to compete.  When, in addition, 
markets are very small, and/or learning rates are very slow and and/or licensing fees are very 
high, then firm 2 will learn so slowly that it will incur a debt that is too large to pay back in an 
acceptable time period.  When instead firm 2 learns relatively quickly (independent of the 
value for θ) and when the degree of consumer price sensitivity is high combined with an 
intermediate speed of learning, then it is better for the learning firm to employ strategic 
pricing. Hence, strategic pricing brings benefits only when consumers are price sensitive, and 
when learning is not too slow (i.e. when N and λ are small and δ is large). This result is of 
interest since common intuition might suggest the opposite: it is when learning is very fast 
that no-loss pricing might have an advantage since the learning firm could potentially reach t* 
relatively quickly even without borrowing. 
 
One of the limitations faced by the model is the simplicity of our specification of 
demand in (2).  One way to improve this is to make the degree of consumer price sensitivity, 
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θ, endogenous. This would not only make the demand curve smoother (hence more realistic) 
but also allow the pricing strategy employed by firms to evolve with the degree of consumer 
price sensitivity. A simple way to make the degree of consumer price sensitivity endogenous 
is to postulate that consumers care more about prices the more prices actually differ between 
firms (for a homogeneous product). In the no-loss case, this would cause θ to first begin very 
high (due to δ), then fall as firm 2 moves down its learning, and then rise again as firm 2 
produces past t*.  Instead of making price constant in the strategic pricing case, ξ in (4) could 
be made to decrease as 2c falls (the lower is firm 2’s cost, the more it can afford to undercut 
firm 1’s price). Since our results in proposition #4 show that the optimal pricing strategy 
depends on both θ and the speed of learning, making θ endogenous would cause the optimal 
pricing strategy to evolve.  This type of feedback could create interesting dynamics to be 
explored via simulation.   Nevertheless, our exploration with endogenous θ indicates that the 
only real difference is that unlike in the comparative statics excercises with an exogenous θ, 
there is no longer a unique s* since s* depends on the value of θ at each time period and 
hence at the particular time period market shares are observed. Increases in the speed of 
learning cause s* to increase but all the dynamics relating to t* in propositions 1-4 do not 
change.12 
 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
Studies addressing reasons why best practice techniques do not always become 
dominant have focused on the role of positive feedback and network externalities in causing 
inefficient techniques to get ‘locked into’. This occurs due to the processes which block 
selection from rewarding higher fitness. Here we have looked at another angle of this issue: 
what are the problems that can arise when selection rewards fitness too strongly? We explored 
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the effect of myopic selection in industrial markets on product market performance. On the 
face of it, a simple minded application of the natural selection/market competition analogy 
would suggest that firms operating in very competitive product markets would not by very 
innovative. In particular, an innovation whose introduction incurs costs in the short run will 
be a risky proposition for a firm whose performance is judged only on its current activities.  
 
We have argued, however, that this argument is too simple. In the first place, very 
competitive markets reward innovations which somehow make it on the market, and the 
rewards are more than commensurate with the importance of the innovation (at least for the 
kinds of process which our model describes). More fundamentally, the simple analogy 
between natural selection and market competition breaks down.  This occurs because firms 
typically face two different types of selection pressures13. In addition to normal product 
market selection forces (driven by consumer behaviour), firms are also selected by the capital 
market which governs the conditions under which they can borrow or raise funds. In our 
model, it turns out that these two sets of selection pressures do not reinforce each other. 
Instead, capital market selection eases constraints on firms in precisely those circumstances 
where they are most constrained by product market selection pressures. The fact that product 
market selection is myopic means that successful innovations will be well rewarded, and 
these, in turn, are the kinds of innovations which capital market agents are most likely to want 
to support. As a consequence, when capital markets are not too myopic, the myopia of 
product market selection can actually facilitate the introduction of new technologies.  
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Table I:  t* with λ=.1 and different initial costs and market sizes 
 
Table II:  t* with N=100 , different learning indices and initial costs 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
      δ=.4      δ=.4      δ=.5      δ=.5
       θ s* t*     N=50 t*   N=100 t*     N=50 t*   N=100
1 0% never never never never
0.99 99.50% 659 230 4149 1932
0.9 95% 66 34 411 206
0.8 90% 34 18 206 104
0.7 85% 23 12 138 70
0.6 80% 18 10 104 53
0.5 75% 15 8 83 42
0.4 70% 12 7 70 36
0.3 65% 11 6 60 31
0.2 60% 10 6 53 27
0.1 55% 9 5 47 24
0.001 50.05% 8 4 42 22
0 50% 7 4 41 21
1 2 3 4 5
            θ           s* λ=.1, δ=.4 λ=.5, δ=.4 λ=.5, δ=.9
1 0% never never never 
0.99 99.50% 230 5 199
0.9 95% 34 2 21
0.8 90% 18 2 11
0.7 85% 12 2 8
0.6 80% 10 2 6
0.5 75% 8 2 5
0.4 70% 7 2 5
0.3 65% 6 2 4
0.2 60% 6 2 4
0.1 55% 5 2 4
0.001 50.05% 5 2 3
0 50% 4 1 2
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Table III: t* with strategic pricing and N=50, λ=.1 and different initial costs (δ)  
 
 
 
   Table IV: θ vs. profits (π) under strategic pricing with different market sizes     
   (N), λ=-.1 and δ = .5 (numerical values for Figure III) 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
N=100 N=60 N=50 N=40 N=10
           θ       π       π       π      π     π 
0 139 9.6 -14 -34 -46
0.1 178 26 -3 -27 -48
0.2 218 43 9 -19 -49
0.3 260 62 23 -10 -50
0.4 304 82 37 -0.61 -51
0.5 349 103 53 9.6 -52
0.6 396 124 69 20 -53
0.7 444 147 85 31 -53
0.8 493 170 103 43 -54
0.9 543 194 121 56 -54
1 595 218 139 70 -54
1 2 3 4 5 6
δ=.4 δ=.4 δ=.5 δ=.5
        θ        s* t* T t* T
1 0% 4 3 21 34
0.99 99.50% 4 3 21 35
0.9 95% 4 4 22 36
0.8 90% 4 4 23 39
0.7 65% 4 5 25 41
0.6 80% 5 5 26 44
0.5 75% 5 5 28 47
0.4 70% 5 6 30 50
0.3 65% 6 6 32 55
0.2 60% 6 7 35 59
0.1 55% 6 9 38 65
0.001 50% 7 9 41 72
0 50% 7 9 41 73
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Figure I: effect of initial cost difference on t*, with: λ=-.1, N=50 
 
Figure II: relationship between t* and θ under different pricing strategies 
(N=100, λ=.1, and δ=.5) 
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Figure III:  θ vs. profits (π) under strategic pricing with 
different market sizes (N), λ=-.1 and δ = .5 
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NOTES 
                                                          
1 Empirical estimates of learning curves often produce estimates in the region of a 25-
30% progress ratio.  For example, the B-29 bomber have a progress ratio of 29.5% 
and large-scale integrated circuits 20% (Scherer and Ross, 1990, p. 98; see also 
Asher, 1956; Boston Consulting Group, 1972). 
 
2 See, for example, Silverberg et al. (1988) and Metcalfe (1997). 
 
3 For simplicity, we neglect discounting. Clearly, the higher is the discount rate, the 
longer it will take to pay back any initially incurred loss caused by investments in 
learning. 
 
4 For more general treatments of optimal pricing when learning by doing is present, 
see Cabral and Riordan (1994) and Spence (1981).  
 
5 Notice that we are not allowing firm 1 to borrow in order to match firm 2’s strategic 
pricing. The only possible way that firm 1 could generate future profits to offset 
current losses incurred in this way would be if it were able to drive firm 2 (and all 
subsequent entrants) out of the market, and set monopoly prices. However, once it 
tries to do this, firm 2 can re-enter and begin learning.  In the absence of a long run 
permanent cost advantage over firm 2, it is hard to see how it would be in firm 1’s 
advantage to prey on firm 2 in this way.  
 
6  This result is also reported by Cabral and Riordan (1994)  who observe that the 
higher is the variance of the distribution of consumer tastes, the higher is the market 
share of the learning firm. 
 
7 Recall that the special structure of the demand function that we are using mean that 
all that matters is whether firm 1’s price is above or below firm 2’s: the amount of 
extra sales that the low price firm gets depends only on the fact that it has a lower 
price and not on the size of the price difference. With more subtle characterizations of 
demand, the optimal discount (prior to t*) and mark-up (after t*) become interesting 
choice variables. 
 
8 Notice that the introduction of any amount of discounting would increase both t* and 
T, making the introduction of the learning technology even less likely. 
 
9 This is, of course, consistent with a large but not always satisfactory literature which 
asserts that many capital markets (and particularly those in the US and the UK) suffer 
from “short-termism”. 
 
10 For example, Cabral and Riordan (1994) argue that it is always better for the 
learning firm to price strategically.   
 
11 Although one could argue with the arbitrary time (t=100) period chosen to record 
the results, by choosing a rather high time period, we are giving the strategic pricing 
case an easier chance to win. 
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12 In those excercises, we used Eq. (5) below to explore endogenous θ: 
{ }211 )1( pptt −−+= − γγθθ   where 10 ≤≤ γ    (5) 
where if γ is close to 0 consumers’ degree of price sensitivity (θ) evolves with price 
differences and the higher is the price difference the more θ changes, while if γ is 
close to 1 price sensitivity does not change much. 
 
13 This is also true for the reasons identified in Gould and Lewontin (1979): evolution 
is not always progressive (fitness enhancing) due to the existence of inertia, non-
linearities and random mutations.  
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